BBC Investigation Exposes Kurdish Crime Network Enabling Illegal Migrant Employment Across UK

A sophisticated criminal network is facilitating illegal employment of asylum seekers in mini-marts across Britain through a system of "ghost directors" and front companies, a BBC investigation has revealed, raising urgent questions about immigration enforcement and organized crime in the United Kingdom.

The network, operating primarily within Kurdish communities, uses fake company directors who register dozens of businesses on Companies House, Britain's official company registry without actually running them. These arrangements enable asylum seekers, who generally lack legal work permission, to operate shops that profit substantially from illegal cigarettes and vapes.

UK Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood responded to the investigation, stating: "Illegal working and linked organised criminality creates an incentive for people to come here illegally. We will not stand for it." The government claims to have increased enforcement raids by 51% and raised maximum fines for businesses employing illegal workers to £60,000 per person.

However, the BBC's four-month investigation uncovered a far-reaching operation linking more than 100 mini-marts, barbershops, and car washes from Dundee in Scotland to south Devon in England. Financial crime investigators believe the network extends even further nationwide.

Two undercover BBC reporters, both Kurdish, posed as asylum seekers seeking to purchase and operate shops. Their investigation revealed a systematic criminal enterprise with multiple coordinated elements:

Ghost directors charge illegal workers £250-300 monthly to register businesses in their names while having no involvement in operations. Individual ghost directors maintain 25-50 businesses simultaneously on Companies House records.

One asylum seeker, using the name Surchi, attempted to sell a Crewe mini-mart called Top Store to undercover reporters for £18,000 cash. Surchi, who claimed his asylum application had been rejected, assured reporters: "You don't need anything" to own and run a mini-mart as an asylum seeker.

Surchi explained he paid someone called "Hadi" approximately £250 monthly for his name to appear on official paperwork. "That's his job, and he probably has 40 to 50 shops under his name. There's no problem, he doesn't mind what you sell," Surchi told reporters.

The arrangement enabled Surchi to avoid immigration enforcement, operate without paying council tax, and sell prohibited products with minimal consequences. He claimed immigration enforcement officers had visited only once in five years, never returning afterward.

The investigation found that all but one of the shops visited sold counterfeit or smuggled cigarettes for approximately £4 per pack—compared to the average UK legal price of £16 for 20 cigarettes. One operator claimed weekly takings from illicit tobacco "sometimes, up to £3,000."

Surchi openly sold vapes to teenagers during the BBC's visit, stating: "I have customers that are 12 years old, I don't have any problem with them." Such sales violate UK laws prohibiting tobacco and vape sales to minors under 18.

Trading Standards had raided Surchi's shop once, resulting in a £200 fine for selling illegal cigarettes and vapes. Under UK law, shop owners caught selling these items face fines up to £10,000—but profits far exceed penalties, creating little deterrent effect.

Surchi showed reporters his "stash car" where he hid bulk stock until 17:00 daily—when Trading Standards officers typically finish work—and demonstrated basement hiding spaces for illegal products. He also revealed tampering with electricity meters to avoid utility bills.

The investigation discovered Kurdish builders offering specialized construction services to conceal illegal products. When one undercover reporter posted on Facebook seeking "a specialist to build a space to hide cigarettes," six builders responded.

One builder sent a video of an elaborate vending machine hidden in a loft that, at button-press, dispensed cigarette packets through a chute to a concealed vent below. The builder claimed this "fine craftsmanship," costing £6,000, was "guaranteed to fool Trading Standards' sniffer dogs."

Such sophisticated concealment demonstrates the network's organizational capacity and willingness to invest substantial sums in evading enforcement.

The BBC identified four principal ghost directors controlling over 100 company directorships:

Hadi Ahmad Ali, a Birmingham-based man in his 40s, appeared on Companies House records as director of more than 50 businesses—mini-marts, barbers, and car washes. When contacted by undercover reporters, Ahmad Ali confirmed the Crewe shop didn't belong to him, but the lease was in his name. He offered to maintain this arrangement for £250-300 monthly and said he could "try to provide a bank card" for the shop.

"I will give you a 50% guarantee that I can get you a bank card. I have another six to seven shops under my name in Hull and other places," Ahmad Ali told reporters.

In October 2024, Ahmad Ali was disqualified from being a company officer for five years following illegal cigarette sales at a Chorley, Lancashire shop—including sales to a 16-year-old. Separately, he pleaded guilty to involvement in illegal cigarette sales in Lincolnshire and received a six-month suspended prison sentence.

When confronted by the BBC, Ahmad Ali claimed the mini-marts were "nothing to do with him" and said he had contacted Companies House to remove his name from businesses. However, he remained listed as an active director on several businesses at the time of the investigation.

Ismael Ahmedi Farzanda, responsible for 25 mini-marts, told undercover reporters: "I just put the shops under my name for people." Based in the West Midlands like Ahmad Ali, Farzanda said an "accountant" would handle paperwork, bank accounts, and payments.

Farzanda's only request was that if reporters were caught by police, they should notify him immediately: "If you know you're caught, tell us so that for the interviews we can change the name and not get in trouble."

Farzanda was fined £4,500 in August after a shop registered in his name in Haslingden, Lancashire, sold illegal vapes to a 14-year-old. Trading Standards confirmed that 17 shops registered under Ahmad Ali and Farzanda's names have been raided since 2021, with illegal tobacco and vapes seized.

When presented with evidence, Farzanda denied all BBC allegations.

The BBC identified two additional ghost directors controlling 40 companies between them, bringing the total documented network to over 100 company directorships among just four individuals.

Analysis of Companies House records revealed systematic fraud patterns. Companies would operate for approximately one year, dissolve, then re-register with slight variations: different spellings of business names, altered director names, or modified birthdates.

Graham Barrow, a financial crime investigator, showed the BBC's data, explaining: "Why are they doing that? It's most likely to evade tax and to dodge scrutiny by authorities." Barrow characterized the network as having "all the red flags that I would associate with organised criminal networks."

Barrow believes the network extends beyond the BBC's documented cases: "I certainly think it's hundreds. It could easily be bigger than that."

The investigation revealed asylum seekers working extremely long hours for minimal pay while awaiting Home Office decisions. A Blackpool mini-mart worker linked to a ghost director said he left an asylum-seeker hotel in Liverpool to work 14-hour days for £60-65 daily—initially working three months at just £50 per day, or approximately £4 per hour.

He was interviewed by the Home Office four months prior, but hadn't received a decision. The shop had been raided by Trading Standards three times, which he dismissed as "nothing." He explained that when asked for identification, he would provide the name of the famous Kurdish singer Aziz Waisi, and the authorities would leave.

However, he expressed concern about immigration enforcement specifically: "They [Trading Standards] take the cigarettes and leave, but immigration makes you do fingerprints."

Another Kurdish worker at a Salford shop registered under Farzanda's name described being in limbo: "I've been here for six months and I still haven't claimed asylum." The 42-year-old had previously lived in the UK as a teenager before returning to Kurdistan. He said upon returning this year, "They found my previous fingerprint records, but nothing came of it."

"Honestly, we're all struggling here and don't know what to do," he told reporters.

The two Kurdish journalists conducting the undercover investigation acknowledged tensions surrounding immigration in Britain and expressed concern that coverage of illegal activities within their community could inflame hostilities.

One reporter, himself a former asylum seeker, explained his motivation: "I wanted to play a role in uncovering these illegal activities [...] to say loudly that they don't represent us."

Most individuals involved told reporters they came from the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq—an area straddling the borders of Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Often called Kurdistan, it is not an independent country. Both undercover reporters said they know Kurdish people who arrived in the UK on small boats and claimed to be Iranian, believing this would improve their asylum application success rates.

Under UK law, asylum seekers generally lack work permission while their claims are processed. Permission is granted only in limited circumstances with strict conditions. When granted, asylum seekers can only apply for eligible jobs on the Immigration Salary List, which excludes shop management or shop assistant positions.

This creates a legal paradox: asylum seekers often wait months or years for claim decisions without legal income sources, creating vulnerability to exploitation by criminal networks offering illegal employment.

The BBC visited more than a dozen mini-marts linked to ghost directors, finding consistent patterns. Shops operated on rundown High Streets in some of Britain's most deprived areas: Blackpool, Bradford, Huddersfield, Hull, and similar economically struggling communities.

This geographic distribution is not coincidental. Deprived areas typically have weaker local authority capacity for enforcement, lower commercial rents making shop acquisition easier, and populations more likely to purchase cheaper illegal cigarettes due to economic constraints.

For Ghana and other countries with significant diaspora populations in the UK, this investigation illuminates challenges facing migrants navigating British immigration systems. Ghana maintains substantial communities in Britain, with many Ghanaians experiencing similar legal uncertainties during visa and asylum processes.

The investigation also raises questions relevant to Ghana's own regulatory environment. Like the UK's Companies House, Ghana's Registrar General's Department maintains company registrations. Ensuring these systems cannot be exploited by criminal networks requires robust verification processes and inter-agency cooperation—lessons applicable across jurisdictions.

Ghana's Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO) and other enforcement bodies face similar challenges in combating organized crime networks that exploit regulatory gaps. The UK case demonstrates how criminals can hide behind legitimate-appearing corporate structures for extended periods despite multiple enforcement actions.

The investigation also highlights universal migration pressures. Economic disparities between regions—whether between Kurdistan and the UK, or between West African nations and more prosperous destinations—create incentives for irregular migration and vulnerability to exploitation by criminal facilitators.

Beyond Home Secretary Mahmood's statement, the government claims to have "seized millions of pounds worth of unlicensed goods, banned dodgy directors and removed more than 35,000 people with no right to be in the UK."

However, the BBC investigation suggests enforcement remains inadequate. Despite multiple raids on shops linked to identified ghost directors, the same individuals continue operating with minimal consequences. Fines of £200-£4,500 represent small fractions of illegal profits, while suspended sentences provide no meaningful deterrent.

A Companies House spokesperson stated the organization "now has greater powers to share information and support law enforcement investigations," adding that "where criminality is suspected, information and intelligence are shared with relevant partners."

Yet the continued operation of this network, with ghost directors maintaining dozens of businesses despite known criminal activity, suggests information sharing and enforcement coordination remain insufficient.

The investigation creates pressure on UK authorities to demonstrate effective action against the exposed network. Key questions include:

Will the four identified ghost directors face prosecution beyond the limited penalties already imposed? Can authorities successfully dismantle the broader network that financial crime investigators believe extends to hundreds of businesses?

Will Companies House implement more rigorous verification to prevent individuals from registering multiple businesses while banned or under investigation? Can enforcement agencies coordinate effectively across Trading Standards, immigration enforcement, and tax authorities?

For asylum seekers trapped in legal limbo, will the government address systemic delays creating vulnerability to criminal exploitation? Or will enforcement focus solely on punishing illegal workers rather than examining why asylum claim processing takes months or years, leaving people without legal income options?

The investigation also raises fundamental questions about UK immigration policy. If significant numbers of asylum seekers work illegally in plain sight on High Streets nationwide, what does this reveal about enforcement capacity? And if criminal networks can systematically exploit regulatory systems for years despite multiple raids and fines, what systemic reforms are necessary?

For Kurdish communities in Britain, the investigation creates reputational challenges. Community leaders must navigate between condemning criminal activity and ensuring entire communities aren't stigmatized based on actions of criminal minorities, a balance familiar to diaspora communities worldwide when illegal activities by some members attract negative attention to all.

The coming months will reveal whether this investigation catalyzes meaningful reform or represents another exposé generating temporary attention before systems return to previous patterns a test of Britain's regulatory capacity and political will to address organized crime exploiting immigration system vulnerabilities.